PART I

ROUSSEAU AN D THE MODERN SIGNATURE
Barbarus hie ego sum, quia non intelligor illis.
-Ovid
CHAPTER ONE
The Name of a Problem
What if one were to read "Rousseau" as signature, and the works signed by that name as support for the signature? Is such an order tenable, does it hold together, will it get us anywhere to think an inversion or a literalization of the figure of the signa ture? Let us say Rousseau wrote what he wrote so as to have something to do with his signature. This is not to suggest a psychological motivation that we would pretend to be able to detect. The "logic" we want to isolate is both before and beyond "psycho-logic." Indeed, it is this lack of coincidence-at once an excess and a lack-between the signature and the proper name which installs the problem we want to consider in the case of "Rousseau." As to why that signature before any other, we can do no better than refer to Jacques Derrida's answers to a similar question.
The second part of Of Grammatology opens with a series of questions about the choice of the "age of Rousseau" as exem plary of the West's logocentric metaphysics: "Why accord an 'exemplary' value to the 'age of Rousseau'? What privileged place does Jean-Jacques Rousseau occupy in the history of logo centrism? What is meant by that proper name? And what are the relationships between that name and the texts to which it was underwritten?" Several pages of introduction propose a preliminary form for the answers that Derrida will work out at length in his following chapters. Rousseau's work, he writes, "seems to me to occupy, between Plato's Phaedrus and Hegel's Encyclopedia, a singular position." This singular situation is ascribed to a new model of presence: "Rousseau is undoubtedly the only one or the first one to make a theme or a system of the reduction of writing profoundly implied by the entire age ... but [he] starts from a new model of presence: the subject's self presence within consciousness or feeling." But the "privilege" that is accorded here-the privilege of being first-goes less to Rousseau than to "Rousseau," that is, to the name: "The names of authors or of doctrines have here no substantial value. They indicate neither identity nor causes .... The indicative value that I attribute to them is first th e name of a problem " (italics added).1 "Rousseau" is the name of a problem, the problem of the idealist exclusion of writing-of materiality, of exterior ity-in the name of the subject's presence to itself. Of Gram matology's coup de force against this exclusion has meant, first of all, that one can no longer approach Rousseau's text with complacent disregard for the supplementary writing that takes the self-present concept beyond itself.2 Rousseau will have been transformed, reinscribed as "Rousseau." Second, there fore, the transformation will have made of Rousseau's problem not an isolated aberration nor an individual case. Rather, the name "Rousseau" can now be said to supplement the signature on any text and to make of its property, its identity, a problem.
And it is in this sense that we can speak of "Jean-Jacques Rousseau" as the first "modern" signature. We take "Rous seau" to name the problem of a signature that cannot sign for itself, by which we mean both that it carries no guarantee of authenticity and that it cannot sign on its own. This is not just Rousseau's problem, but for reasons to be explored one may say that his texts uncover the structural limits on the properness of I Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 1976) , 97-99. 2Qr it means that one can no longer be satisfied with such disregard when it is encountered in "new" readings of Rousseau, such as Tzvetan Todorov, Freie Bonheur, essai sur Rousseau (Paris, 1985)1 as well as his presentation of an anthology of essays on Rousseau's political writings, Pensee de Rousseau (Paris, 1985) . any signature. In Derrida's reading, Rousseau's notion of truth as self-presence is made to depend on the reliable authenticity of a subject's expression of some "internal feeling." In this expressive relation between the interiority of feeling and the exteriority of discourse, only the subject can say what only the subject feels, but his word is no guarantee that he indeed feels what he expresses or expresses what he feels. Having once engaged his word to speak only the truth that he feels, Rousseau will find himself constrained to multiply the acts of guaran teeing with another signature what he has already signed. Yet no single act of signing can ever sign for itself, and this leaves the door open to all sorts of improprieties and expropriations.
By the "modern" signature we also understand one that com pels a certain fascination for the living author or the life of the signatory. It is a fascination exercised in the wake of texts like the Confessions or the Reveries, the autobiographical writings with which Rousseau tried to pin down his own signature on such volatile works as Du contrat social and Emile. The fas cination that compulsively substitutes the narrative of a life for the disjunctions and disruptions of a work found its first or at least its most receptive repository in Rousseau himself. Rous seau's writing "career" (by which we mean the career of the signature "Rousseau") is, we might say, emblematic of what was to become the sense of signature in a postclassical age, the age of the writing subject writing about itself or in its own name. Since "Rousseau, " it has seemed only natural to ask: In whose name? The demand to know who signs, the move to authenticate the signature are gestures that Rousseau was, to a significant extent, the first to perform and he performed them on "himself" in somewhat the same way that Freud, the foun der of another institution of self-reflection, had to perform his own analysis. To an important extent unlike both Augustine and Montaigne (his apparent precursors), Rousseau wrote his Confessions to justify and authenticate a signature already cir culating widely so that, at a certain point in its career (after the ban on Emile and the pursuit of the author), his signature is entirely concerned with countersigning what had already been signed. And it is this necessity of doubling itself that marks a certain turn (or turnover) in the history of signature. Indeed, one could justifiably speak of a historicization or narrativization of the signature. Doubling itself, the signature "Rousseau" un covers what must always divide it; it exposes the limit at which one signs-and signs again.
Two moments of Rousseau's signature display this limit in a very economical way. Provisionally, we will call them the first and last instances of "Rousseau." We can also, therefore and just as provisionally, call the narrative they bracket its history.
Rousseau the First, Rousseau th e Second
In book IV of Th e Confessions, a remarkable tangle occurs that crosses the name "Rousseau" first with a pseudonym, then with a homonym. To straighten things out, Rousseau signs.
During the winter 1730-3 1, Rousseau is living in Lausanne under the anagrammatic name of Vaussore de Villeneuve and passing himself off (although not too successfully) as a Parisian music teacher.3 In April 1731, he travels as Vaussore to the border town of Soleure where he is cornered by the French ambassador (who must have had his reasons for suspecting the young man's story) and led to give up his masquerade. In this brief account of his confession of his identity to a representative of France, one may already read a mise en abim e of Th e Con fessions as a whole:
Having given myself out as a Parisian, I was, as such, under his Excellency's jurisdiction. He asked me who I was, and exhorted me to tell the truth. I promised to do so, and asked him for a private audience, which was granted. The Ambassador took me to his study, and shut the door. I threw myself at his feet and kept my word. I should not have confessed less, even if I had made no promise; for a continual need of opening my heart brings it at every moment to my lips.4 3Christie McDonald has analyzed some elements of this episode with par ticular attention to the musical improvisation/impersonation in "En-harmoni ques: L'anagramme de Rousseau," Etudes Franr;aises 17 IOctober 1981).
4The Confessions of fean-facques Rousseau, trans. J. M. Cohen !London, 195 3), 161. Translations are from this edition with pages noted in parentheses.
The episode impresses the ambassador, who is so "pleased with my little story, and with the way he saw I poured out my heart in telling it to him [et de !'effusion de coeur avec laquelle il vit que je l'avais contee],11 that he intervenes to straighten out the young man's affairs and set him on the road to Paris, where, indeed, Rousseau will endeavor to make his fortune as a musi cian. No sooner, however, has the young man left his private audience with the ambassador, no sooner has Vaussore the musician changed places with Rousseau the Genevan watch maker's son, than this Rousseau aspires to change places with the other Rousseau, the poet.
M. de la Martiniere, secretary to the embassy, was, in a manner, entrusted with the care of me. While showing me to the room which was intended for me, he said: "This room, in the time of the Comte du Luc, was occupied by a celebrated man of the same name as yourself; it rests with you to supply his place in every respect, so that it may one day be said Rousseau premier, Rous seau second." This similarity, of which at that time I had little hopes, would have flattered my ambition less, if I had been able to foresee how heavy would be the price I should one day have to pay for it.
M. de la Martiniere's words excited my curiosity. I read the works of the writer whose room I occupied; and, having regard to the compliment which had been paid me, and believing that I had a taste for poetry, I composed a cantata. (162; 1:157) For as long as he thought his chances for renown-for making a name for himself-lay in that direction, Rousseau practiced more or less systematically his imitations of Jean-Baptiste Rousseau. In a prefatory note to one of the few published poems, 5 the editor of the journal invokes the same homonymy Modifications to the translation are not noted. When no published translation of a work of Rousseau's is available, translations are my own from the Oeuvres completes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris, 1959-69) ; vol ume and page numbers of this edition will also be included in parentheses (e.g., l :l 57).
5Rousseau, "Epitre a M. Bordes, " Journal de Verdun, March 1743; see 2: l 130-33.
to compliment the young poet: "You will see ... that he is able to support the renown of the great name he bears, and that if he continues to practice Poetry, and to perfect his practice, it may well happen one day that the inhabitants of Parnassus will say: Rousseau I, Rousseau 11."6 Rousseau himself makes a some what different prediction in a fragment written long after he had given up his aspirations as a poet:
Neither Homer nor Virgil was ever called a great man although they were very great Poets. Some authors have gone to great lengths during my life to call the Poet Rousseau the great Rous seau. When I die, the Poet Rousseau will be a great Poet, but he will no longer be the great Rousseau . While it is not impossible for an author to be a great man, it is not by writing books, whether in verse or in prose, that he will become one. (Fragment 3 8; 1: 1129) This fragment makes clear a structure at work in the first encounter with the homonym at Soleure: to sign "Rousseau" is to take the name of the already monumentalized Poet, but also already to see one's name as a monument left to stand in the place of life, after death.
Th e Telltale Heart
These various crossings of Rousseau's identity, the slipping from pseudonym to homonym, can be traced to the structure of what passes as the one moment of true naming. At the heart of this truth, which stands between a fraud and a copy, is the metaphor of a heart made manifest. In confessing his real name, Rousseau had, he writes, his heart on his lips, "son coeur sur ses levres," and the ambassador was moved to generosity (even though he had just heard the confession of a fraud) because of the "way he saw I poured out my heart in telling it to him." Having promised to tell the truth of who he is, Rousseau honors his word but he gives even more than he promised: not just his word, not just his name, but the truth of both word and name which is the heart. 6Cited by the editors in a note, 2: 1893. This quotation suggests that Rousseau might have misremembered or simply invented M. de la Martiniere's remark, attributing to him the formula that another had used much later.
To tell the truth when one has promised to do so is to leave open to question whether one is telling the truth or keeping a promise. Rousseau seems to anticipate this question because he writes: "I should not have confessed less, even if I had made no promise" ("Je n'aurais pas moins dit quand je n'aurais rien promis").7 What would be at issue is whether this truth comes from the subject, who gives his name of himself and to himself, or whether the truth of the name lies outside the subject which it names in a contract with some other. The movement of the "coeur" from inside to outside appears to decide this question because it gives the name its seal of truth from within and makes of the contractual promise to the other an external and unnecessary circumstance. With his heart on his lips, Rousseau has a reinforced instrument with which both to tell the truth and to tell that he is telling the truth. If this episode might be taken as a model of the felicitous or successful confession of identity (which is also an excuse for the false identity "Vaus sore"), it is because it leaves no room for doubting the truth of what is being told. The gap into which such doubt might have slipped is closed off when the heart moves to the lips and puts its seal on what is spoken.
Rousseau's "effusion de coeur" seems to have a unidirec tional sense, from inside to outside. But that phrase itself occurs in an ambiguous syntactic location between the two parties to this speech act. The ambassador was, we read, "content de ma petite histoire et de l'effusion de coeur avec laquelle il vit que je l'avais contee [with the way he saw I poured out my heart]." No doubt the ambassador saw many things in the course of the scene in his office-tears or gestures (Rousseau writes that he threw himself at the feet of his interlocutor, although that may be just another manner of speaking). To say, however, that he saw an "effusion de coeur" is to compound a metaphor of expression by a metaphor of reception. The effect of this use of the verb to see is to blind one to the first metaphor and to lend a phenomenal appearance to the heart's invisible metaphoricity.
71n the first version of Du contrat social, Rousseau insists that "there is a great difference between executing what one had promised, because one has promised it, and still wanting it even if one had not previously promised it" (nrs-16).
The second metaphor, in other words, covers and covers for the first. A complicity links the mode of recounting his identity ("man coeur sur mes levres") to the mode of receiving that account.
And, in fact, in the phrase "!'effusion de coeur avec laquelle il vit que je l'avais contee, " a second syntactic possibility desig nates the "effusion de coeur" as coming from the ambassador, more precisely as that with which the ambassador "sees" Rous seau's account of his name: the outpouring of the heart with wh ich he saw that I had told it. This eccentric reading goes against the sense of the story-Rousseau's interiority made manifest-because it situates the metaphor of the heart in a space between its emission and reception. It also complicates considerably the scene we are trying to read because, instead of an interiority made manifest, it now seems that the heart is a metaphor for the interval of meaning-its pulsing rhythm between intention and reception, and that that metaphor has been internalized. To say Rousseau's confession of his name interiorizes the metaphor of interiority is but to remark once again that it literalizes the figure by closing a gap within the subject who speaks "from the heart." Rousseau, we could say, has been literally taken in by the metaphor that represents the meaning of meaning as an interiority to be poured out. When, therefore, he pours out his name, the metaphor acts itself out and carries its interval over to the very heart of the truth the subject can speak about himself. The heart seals or signs the account only when it has been doubled in the heart-to-heart, only once the ambassador can "see" with his heart all the heart Rousseau put into his story. This is to say that the confession is signed "Jean-Jacques Rousseau" from the place of the other as represented in the story by that representative of the French sovereign, the ambassador.
But is it also to say that anyone can sign in Rousseau's place?
Double Trouble
To begin to measure the pertinence of the latter question, we must let this history of Rousseau's signature continue to .unTh e Name of a Problem I 3 r fold. For, in fact, the confession at Soleure is not sealed off by the scene in the ambassador's closed office, but goes on du plicating itself. We have already remarked this condition when we pointed to the mise en abim e of Th e Confessions in the episode. The account in book IV marks a folding back on itself of the text of Th e Confessions to that point. Because of this duplicating structure, a reader might fail to notice that Rous seau reports nothing whatsoever of what he said to the ambas sador during their private audience. The assumption is perhaps too easily made that he confessed to some abbreviated version of his life and adventures as recorded in books I-IV. That as sumption, however, merely comes to fill the place left vacant in the account. All one can really affirm is that Rousseau claims that he spoke passionately and that his speech was received sympathetically. Nothing in the account excludes the possibili ty that the ambassador heard yet another story from Rousseau alias Vaussore, and indeed several details suggest that the young man may have presented himself as an aspiring poet in need of a benefactor. This would explain, for example, why M. de la Martiniere, who had not been present to hear the boy's story, wanted to see a sample of his style: "M. de la Martiniere wanted to see how I could write [voulut voir de man style], and asked me to give him in writing the same details as I had given to the ambassador. I wrote him a long letter [Je lui ecrivis une longue lettre] ... " (163; 1:157).
Whatever may have been the secretary's reasons for request ing it, this letter, which duplicates an act of confession, ac quires an authenticating function. Or at least it is to such a virtual function that Rousseau points when he cites the con tinued existence of the letter: "I wrote him a long letter, which I hear has been preserved .... I have asked M. de Malesherbes to try and get me a copy of this letter. If I can procure it through him or through others, it will be found in the collection which is intended to accompany my Confessions. " This letter, if it could be produced, would supply the account of Rousseau's confession to the ambassador that is missing from Th e Con fessions. Or rather, since nothing can guarantee that Rousseau did not give different accounts of himself to the ambassador and to the secretary, producing the letter would tend to substantiate at least one of these accounts. But this would not seem to be the principal concern here. Rather, the concern is with a guarantee for the signature "Jean-Jacques Rousseau" on a text-Th e Con fessions-that is itself but the explanation or description of its signature. If one were to put this guarantee in writing, so to speak, it would have to read something like this: I, the signatory of Th e Confessions of fean-facques Rousseau, declare that this is a true account and, as proof of that statement, I submit a copy of a letter in question there in which the signatory, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, declares that he is Jean-Jacques Rousseau and no other. By doubling and redoubling itself, Rousseau's signature would attempt to sign for itself. One can easily see, however, that this structure cannot be closed off and that, having signed once, Rousseau cannot sign once and for all. Every signature, including the "first" signature from the heart, depends on, is constituted by the possibility of its repetition, for example, the repetition in its reception by the ambassador in Rousseau's account. But this is also to say that every signature includes a deviation from itself which may also be an opening for error, falsehood, or duplicity.s Rousseau, it seems, never received the copy of his letter to M. de la Martiniere which he requested. Others continued the search, however, and in 1824 the Musset-Pathay edition pub lished for the first time the text of a letter from the copy submit ted by a certain M. Dubois of Geneva. It begins thus: "To M. de la Martiniere, Secretary to the Embassy at Soleure: I have re counted to you my foolishness and my errors. You have asked me to put them in writing; I obey your orders. Here is a sum mary."9 There follows a rapid telescoping of books I-IV of Th e Confessions, which hits all the high points of decision along the road leading from Geneva to Soleure via Annecy, Turin, Lyon, and Lausanne. This letter, in other words, corresponds neatly to the assumption with which the reader might have already filled ssee below, pt. III, chap. 7, for a further discussion of iterability and possible deviation.
9Rousseau, Oeuvres inedites, ed. V. D. Musset-Pathay \Paris, 1824), 1:3-6.
the gap left in the account. The unbroken succession of briefly declarative sentences that make up this resume resembles more a proces-verbal than the pathetic outpouring that was supposed to have so impressed the ambassador. Subsequent editors and scholars have concluded that the letter is a forg ery . 10 This postscript to the confession at Soleure, which is only one of the many frauds perpetrated in the name of "Rousseau, " would be of limited interest if it did not seem to act out, in a perverse manner, the principle of iteration and deviation divid ing Rousseau's signature. The episode of the signed confession of his identity contained already in embryo the counterfeit that "M. Dubois de Geneve" merely brought to term. Or, put an other way, the false letter arrives because it was dispatched along with the missing original that it imitates. At the origin, already, Rousseau cannot sign "Rousseau" without engaging the doubling mechanism that reproduces, with machinelike indifference, both "true" and "false" copies.
Declaring Something
We suggested earlier that the episode at Soleure may be taken as a first instance in the history of the signature "Rousseau."
The artifice of such a positioning-it was just a place to begin should now be clear since an account of the signature at Soleure cannot remain within the strict limits of a historical narrative inaugurated by a designated firstness. The "first" signature re produces itself long after the signatory has ceased to be able to sign. The artifice is no less evident when we close the brackets within which this "history" was suspended and cite the oppos ing term: Rousseau's "last" signature. This time, however, it is the signatory who would declare that he has signed for the last time.
10"0ne senses that it has been fabricated after a reading of Th e Confessions and nothing about it recalls Jean-Jacques's style at any period of his life, " writes Theophile 
[Declaration concerning various reprintings of his works] 11
When J.J. Rousseau discovered that certain people were hiding themselves from him in order to print his writings secretly in Paris, and that they asserted publicly that it was he who directed these reprintings, he quickly understood that the principal aim of this maneuver was the falsification of these same writings and he wasted no time, despite all the care that was taken to prevent his awareness, from convincing himself with his own eyes of this falsification. . . . Thus, since his writings, in the form that he composed them and published them, no longer exist except in the first edition of each work that he prepared himself, and that have long ago disappeared from public view, he declares all former and new books prin ted or that will be prin ted from now on under his name, in any place wh atsoever, to be either forged or altered, mutilated and falsified, with cruelest malignity, and he dis avows them as being either no longer his work or falsely at tributed to him (il declare tous Jes livres anciens ou nouveaux, qu 'on imprime et qu 'on imprimera desormais sous son nom, en quelque lieu que ce soit, ou faux ou alteres, mu tiles et falsifies, avec la plus cruelle malignite, et Jes desavoue, les uns comme n'etant plus son ouvrage, et Jes autres comme Jui etant fa usse ment attribues]. Since he is helpless to bring his complaints to the ears of the public, he has been led to try as a last resort distributing to various persons copies of this declaration, written and signed by his hand [ecrites et signees de sa main], certain that if among their number there is a single honest and generous soul who has not sold itself to iniquity, then such a necessary and just protest will not remain stifled, and posterity will not judge the senti ments of an unfortunate man on the basis of books that have been disfigured by his persecutors. Paris, 23 fanuary 1774 J. J. ROUSSEAU (1:u86-87; italics added)
Although the date on this declaration situates its composition close to the end of Rousseau's life and although, in fact, after that date he would authorize no other first edition of his signa ture (Les Confession s, Rousseau ;uge de Jean-Jaques, and Les l l "Declaration relative a differentes reimpressions de ses ouvrages"; this title is the editor's.
Reveries were all first published posthumously), these punctual facts do not of themselves suffice for one to read this "Declara tion" as carrying Rousseau's "last" signature. They do not, that is, suffice for a reading of the relation between this declaration about a signature and the signature that signs it.
To declare is to make manifest, to make something known, for example, to declare one's intentions or feelings, to declare love or enmity, or to declare that something is in fact the case. In this latter instance, the declaration functions on one level as a statement or constative, an utterance that, in theory at least, can be verified. But a declaration is often a particularly marked constative, a statement of fact that states that it is a true state ment of fact. For example, a customs declaration of the sort one completes before entering or reentering the United States is incomplete if one neglects to sign the form in the space follow ing the printed words: "I have read the above statements and have made a truthful declaration." Even if one has "nothing to declare, " there is no crossing the symbolic border until one has signed. The constative declaration is incomplete unless accom panied by a performative, an act of signing. Other examples could be cited that would show that this kind of declaration always implies a signature or a subscription to a statement that is being made. If a declaration of this sort is made in someone's name, then to verify it is to check not a general order of fact but a correspondence between some state of things and a particular instance of declaring something about that state assumed by a signatory in his or her name. That is, the signature, in these instances, is first of all an instrument for the particularization of a law's application to those who are subject to the law.
While, however, this declaration implies or requires a signa ture, it is also the case that the signature implies a declaration of the sort: I declare that I am in truth s/he whose name I here sign. There is, in other words, a mutual implication of consta tive declaration and the performance of signature-each resting on and implying the prior establishment of the other. Such implications are not to be easily sorted out even by the most rigorous customs regulations. The "Declaration concerning various reprintings of his works" applies this logic of the mu-tual implication of constative and performative declarations to the breaking point. The signatory, J. J. Rousseau, known to the public at large as the author who has also signed a number of highly provocative works, declares that he is not the author of any work printed under his name "desormais," from now on. This temporal marker or deictic is the mark of a performative force since it situates the effective date of a revised state of affairs: "from now on." In principle, only a dated signature can validate this act, but it is precisely the validity of that signature which has just been canceled by the decree denouncing from now on the signature "J. J. Rousseau" as false. The declaration is not valid unless signed, but how can it be signed without invalidating what is declared-to wit, that from now on the signature "J. J. Rousseau" is false? Thus, the question this text poses would be the following: How can a signature declare its own termination, put an end to itself, and yet still hold in reserve one last place and time to sign so as to validate the act of termination?
This problem will not in the least be resolved when, instead of printing his declaration, Rousseau distributes in person copies that are, as he writes, "ecrites et signees de ma main."12 To find in Rousseau's person an ultimate support for the signa ture that rescues it from the divisions imposed by the text is to try to take refuge in an absent term of presence or "lived experi ence." To be sure, this model of extratextual verifiability is variously invoked in the text of the declaration (principally through the several figures of bodily organs),13 but this only tends to confirm that no presence outside the text speaks for the signature. Nor will it suffice to assert that Rousseau meant to sign his declaration with his person or his presence. The probI2As to why and how Rousseau distributed his declaration "a diverses per sonnes" instead of publishing it, see the editor's note 3, 1 :1872. One cited source claims that various journal editors refused to publish it; another that it was published in La Gazette de Litterature, des sciences et des arts, but this reference cannot be verified. Both of these sources would seem to be contra dicted by the internal logic of the text.
I3for example, "par ses yeux,'' "par ses propres yeux,'' "aux yeux du public," "aux oreilles du public," "de sa main." lematic signature in and on the text cannot be dispelled by such an assertion.14 Why not just overlook all this and read Rousseau's gesture as having a meaning despite or beyond these problems of execu tion? His declared disavowal is but an understandable attempt to distinguish between his signature and its various simulacra. But what even this common sense explanation cannot overlook is that the attempt to save the signature from simulacra takes unmistakably the form of condemning it to disappear from now on . Only the original signature on the first edition "which he prepared himself" ("qu'il a faite lui-meme") would escape this general condemnation, but it is precisely that signature "that has long ago disappeared from public view" ("qui depuis long temps a disparu aux yeux du public"). Inexorably, the logic that would enforce or legislate an unbridgeable separation of origi nal from reprint, of true signatures from simulacra, can do so only by suppressing what it wants to preserve. This logic dem onstrates, therefore, that the only chance for the survival of "Rousseau" as a true signature lies in the perpetuation of an undecidable relation to its simulacra. But its only chance, of course, is as well its greatest risk because the condition of its survival is the lack of any guarantee as to its truth, and it is only on such a condition that we can continue to read "Rousseau." Consider what would have to happen if Rousseau's signature were not so suspended but could somehow have the effect of enforcing the "Declaration" as one made in the name of truth. The name "Rousseau" would no longer truly sign works that are either false attributions or deliberate distortions of lost originals. It would thus survive as the name of an author whose works can be known only through imitations or simulacra. 15 1 4See Derrida, Of Grammatology, pt. II, chap. 2: "And one cannot abstract from the written text to rush to the signified it would mean, since the signified is here the text itself. It is so little a matter of looking for a truth signified by these writings (metaphysical or psychological truth: Jean-Jacques's life behind his work) that if the texts that interest us mean something, it is the engagement and the appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in the same tissue, the same text" (150).
15The suspension of the signature on the "Declaration" is made evident when that text can be allowed to take its place in the Oeuvres completes de fean-Instead of insisting on the dilemma posed by this quirky gesture, why not just acknowledge that when Rousseau made his declaration he was mad and that such a text can only be read as a symptom of that madness? The declaration poses a false problem because it presupposes a malevolent plot to falsify the signature "Rousseau." To take it too seriously, as I have done, is to credit the persecutory delusion of a conspiracy against him which prompted Rousseau to devise such a defense. It is, in other words, to adopt "madness" as a critical point of view. Once one rules out the mad hypothesis on which is constructed this paranoid theory of the signature, then the declaration may be seen for what it is: a document that could only have been written by someone no longer in his right mind, as one says.
This argument makes sense, by which I mean not only that it is reasonable to doubt Rousseau's universal conspiracy theory. Beyond that, however, it makes sense of what otherwise must continue to trouble our sense of meaning. A "Rousseau-not-in his-right-mind" explains the aberration of a signature that has to preserve the simulacrum-that may be false-as the only place from which to sign its disavowal of false simulacra. To say what it means-"J. J. Rousseau is no longer a valid signature" the declaration has to put itself in the position of not meaning what it says, a position of falsity-"signed J. J. Rousseau." This is madness, perhaps, but who is to say it is Rousseau's? Rather than imposing aberrations on his text, this madness would be a madness of the text, the madness of words, of names, and of that special use of names called signature. Rousseau's career as a signer of texts would have displayed a progressive uncovering of the illogical logic of that act, culminating, in a profoundly necessary way, in the declaration we have been reading. Despite the infelicity of its performative, the very fact it is unable to do what it says points to a certain truth that the "Declaration" does not so much declare as leave to function as textual effect. By protesting that his signature is not his, Rousseau is mistaken facques Rousseau. It would seem that either the "Declaration" is truly signed by Rousseau, in which case it denounces any "Complete Works" as a fraud, or else the "Declaration" does not really bear Rousseau's signature, in which case one has to ask why it has been collected among his other writings.
only insofar as he understands that condition to be contingent; but precisely because he is righ t in saying his signature is not his, no declaration on his part can reappropriate it from the state of its dispersion by the texts he signs.
The order of meaning according to which a tortured psycho logical condition dictates an aberrant text, insofar as that order repeats or reflects a unidirectional sense of general meaning, is precisely what is in question in Rousseau's "madness."16 The error, then, would be to trace the aberration of a text like the "Declaration" to a psychological source and thereby to repeat the very error of paranoia imputed to Rousseau that consists in psychologizing the disfigurement his signature has suffered. The declaration closes in exactly this sense: "posterity will not judge the sentiments of an unfortunate man on the basis of books that have been disfigured by his persecutors" ("que la posterite ne [juge] pas des sentiments d'un homme infortune sur des livres defigures par ses persecuteurs "). The error makes sense by giving the process of disfiguration an Author-an in tention, a will, a motive, a cause. The unreadable, produced by contraries that imply rather than exclude each other mutually, becomes readable through the movement of interpretation of a signature, a supposition d'auteur that orders all the disparate and discrete marks into the text or trame of a plot.
Border In cidents
A signature, however, is not an author or even simply the proper name of an author. It is the mark of an articulation at the border between life and letters, body and language. An articula tion both joins and divides; it joins and divides identity with/ 16See Michel Foucault's introduction to Rousseau iuge de fean-faques (Paris, 1962) which ends in dialogue with an interlocutor who wants to judge the text as mad:
-So you're saying the Dialogues is not the work of a madman? -This question would only matter if it had a meaning; but the work, by definition, is non-madness.
-But surely the structure of a work can allow the figure of illness to appear.
-The decisive point is that the reciprocal possibility does not exist. (xxiii) from difference. A difference from itself, within itself, articu lates the signature on the text it signs. This is another reason it cannot be a question here of a history of the signature "Rous seau," for that would suppose a possible identification of the signature itself as distinct from what it is not. It would also suppose a dating of the signature, an identification of the term of its validity. And, as we have just seen, the signature cannot date itself for the same reason it cannot sign for itself. The signature "Rousseau" can be said to have a history only to the extent that its term is unfinished, yet to be terminated. To put this another way: readings of a signature, which are always more or less the function of some identificatory fascination, are part of its history and, in the case of "Rousseau," not neces sarily the least significant part. Nor would such a history be easily distinguishable from the larger political, social, intellec tual histories that have, periodically in France, attempted to rewrite themselves through some kind of reading of "Rous seau"-appropriating, expropriating that name's relation to the functioning of subjectivity in the French language and to the position of the individual in the state. Indeed, it would seem that most of the major revisions of French political discourse since the revolution have been accompanied by a reading of Rousseau and a repositioning or reevaluating of the truth of his "je. " 17 Instead of a history of that signature, then, ''Rousseau" would offer something like a screen onto which history "itself" has been projected. What perhaps has always been at stake in that 1 7Two recent studies have attempted to specify elements of the political history of transference onto the subject of Rousseau's signature. Georges Benre kassa, in Fables de la personne: Pour une histoire de la sub;ectivite (Paris, 1985)1 reviews in great detail some nineteenth-century readings of Rousseau that culminated in the French Third Republic's celebration of the centenary of his death in 1878 and the bicentenary of his birth in 1912. In a more familiar mode, Carol Blum, in Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: Th e Language of Politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986), takes up Robespierre's and Saint-Just's appropriations of Rousseau. For a brief analysis of how Rous seau was read by the reactionary nationalists of the Action Franc;aise, see my "Rousseau's Original Language, " forthcoming in The Harvard History of French Literature, ed. Dennis Hollier.
name is the very possibility of inscribing its truth. "Rousseau" exhibits a problematization of the border and a divisibility of the mark that joins/divides the two poles of the signature-the historically singular subject to which it refers (or seems to refer) and the formal generality of language. Rather than a borderline marked out by the signature, or a line on which the signature signs, this border is itself divided by a line passing somewhere between "Jean-Jacques" and "Rousseau." A text like Rousseau juge de f ean-f aques, for example, seems entirely concerned with soldering the pieces of the signature into a whole, but the double articulation cannot be reduced beyond the line of the hyphen or the trait d'union that maintains the interval of differ ence between the terms it unites. The dividing line, however, has only been displaced because the text that would finally authenticate the signature "J. J. Rousseau" by reducing its du plicity to a single trait has itself to be left unsigned or, more precisely, has to be left for another to sign.
Not a history, then, but a series of border incidents traversing the text "Rousseau" can never quite finish signing. Rousseau juge de fean-faques is only the most sustained and self-reflexive of the series, but the scene staged there has been programmed by many other border confrontations. One of these we have already encountered at Soleure, the town on the border between two national states. To cross this symbolic line between two symbolic entities, a signature is required. But in what language does the stranger sign his name? "I have read the above state ments and have made a truthful declaration." To cross the line a translation is required. But how is one to translate a signature? "Barbarus hie ego sum, quia non intelligor illis" (I am consid ered a barbarian here because they do not understand me) is the epigraph Rousseau placed on Rousseau juge de f ean-f aques. It is a citation from Ovid's poem of exile, Tristia. The same epigraph appears on the work that was the first to make a name for its signatory: the Discours sur Jes scien ces et Jes arts. Bracketing the two extremes of his work, the Latin verse is like Rousseau's signature which here speaks the despair of its untranslatable condition. A signature cannot be translated, but its trait is still marked in the other's language.
